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necturusJohn Gunther, writing in Inside Asia (1939):
"There are designs 'in' Singapore; there are also designs 'on' Singapore. No one in the area thinks of anyone except Japan, if you mention possible aggression. The best military information available is that the island is open to attack only from the mainland in the north. A sea approach is almost impossible, and though an air attack might do damage, it could hardly result in the investment or occupation of the island. To take Singapore, an enemy would have to land infantry detachments somewhere in Malaya, or possibly Siam, and march south."
That, of course, is precisely what the Japanese did three years later. The fall of Singapore on February 15, 1942 would be called by Winston Churchill the "worst disaster" and "largest capitulation" in the history of British arms.
Sometimes, you can see them coming three years in advance and still not be ready.
"There are designs 'in' Singapore; there are also designs 'on' Singapore. No one in the area thinks of anyone except Japan, if you mention possible aggression. The best military information available is that the island is open to attack only from the mainland in the north. A sea approach is almost impossible, and though an air attack might do damage, it could hardly result in the investment or occupation of the island. To take Singapore, an enemy would have to land infantry detachments somewhere in Malaya, or possibly Siam, and march south."
That, of course, is precisely what the Japanese did three years later. The fall of Singapore on February 15, 1942 would be called by Winston Churchill the "worst disaster" and "largest capitulation" in the history of British arms.
Sometimes, you can see them coming three years in advance and still not be ready.
